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Abstract
Using unique survey data on Dutch collective agreement negotiators, the authors model how 
information about other collective bargaining events influences the probability of negotiators 
encountering bargaining impasses or industrial action during collective bargaining. Competing 
hypotheses about this influence, derived from economic, social psychological and sociological 
approaches, are tested. The findings indicate that information about bargaining outcomes 
elsewhere has no significant effect on the occurrence of conflict. However, if the information 
content of spillover refers to the conflict potential in other bargaining events and the sources of 
information are proximate, the probability of conflict is increased. This suggests that sociological 
mechanisms offer a compelling alternative to those invoked in economics for explaining the 
relationship between spillover and conflict.
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Introduction
This study investigates the impact of information spillover in collective bargaining, tak-
ing the perspective of individual negotiators. Empirical research indicates that spillovers 
about bargaining outcomes (e.g. wages) and conflicts (e.g. strikes) from past bargaining 
events and bargaining events in other firms influence the occurrence of conflict in cur-
rent bargaining events. Several conflicting theoretical mechanisms for such spillover 
effects have been proposed. The central tenet of economic bargaining theory is that spill-
over affects negotiators when the information allows them to reduce uncertainty regard-
ing critical but not fully known aspects of the bargain, consequently reducing conflict. 
Social psychologically inspired theories argue that spillovers are driven by social com-
parisons and increase the divergence of preferences at the bargaining table, thereby lead-
ing to more conflict. Moreover, sociological theories of diffusion stress the role of 
spillover as potentially increasing conflict.
Empirical studies on information spillover and conflict produce mixed and partially 
contradictory results (e.g. Babcock et al., 1996; Campolieti et al., 2005; Ingram et al., 
1993; Kuhn and Gu, 1999; Schnell and Gramm, 1987; cf. Biggs, 2002, 2005; Conell 
and Cohn, 1995). Moreover, these studies suffer from two methodological drawbacks. 
First, with the exception of Babcock et al. (1996), the proposed mechanisms in these 
studies are not tested directly. Second, influence is inferred from observed correlations 
between different bargaining events, while such correlations could just as well be 
caused by unobserved variables affecting these bargaining events simultaneously 
(Manski, 1993; Mitchell, 1982).
Thus it remains unclear how conflict in one bargaining event is affected by other bar-
gaining events. This study aims to shed new light on this relationship. Using information 
from Dutch collective agreement negotiators, it addresses the following research ques-
tion: how and under what conditions does information about other bargaining events 
influence the probability of negotiators experiencing conflicts in collective bargaining?
Negotiator surveys have proved successful in wage determination studies but have 
rarely been used to analyse conflict in collective bargaining. Yet such an approach helps 
to overcome many limitations of official strike statistics (Franzosi, 1989) and provides 
important information about key actors determining collective agreements (Kaufman, 
2002). In particular, the analysis of spillovers benefits considerably from the self-reports 
of negotiators, since they measure the influence of information about other bargaining 
events directly. For instance, Babcock et al. (1996) study the relationship between spillo-
ver and conflict using a survey of union and firm negotiators of teachers’ salaries. 
However, they employ considerable a priori limitations on potential reference points 
(Manski, 1993; Mitchell, 1982) and types of information spillover.
This article moves beyond the analysis of a single profession and extends the range of 
potential reference points and types of spillover under analysis. To this end, a representa-
tive sample of Dutch collective agreements was compiled and the negotiators involved 
were surveyed. Spillover measurements distinguished between different information 
sources and different informational content of spillover. Moreover, the data recorded not 
only the occurrence of manifest conflicts such as strikes, but also bargaining impasses, 
thus uncovering conflicts that remain latent due to organizational and institutional 
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constraints, conflicts which are not taken into account in traditional strike statistics. This 
is important because the absence of manifest conflict (strikes) does not negate the exist-
ence of conflict (Dix et al., 2008; Hebdon, 2005) and impasses impose costs on employ-
ers and employees much like strikes do (Kaufman, 1981: 336–7).1
Despite declining unionization, collective bargaining still prominently governs many 
aspects of working life, with an average of 62 per cent of all workers in OECD countries 
covered by a collective agreement (Visser, 2011). In addition, the global financial crisis 
and its aftermath once more made it clear that peaceful labour relations must never be 
taken for granted. Worsening employment relations have increased the risk of social 
unrest in the world’s advanced economies (ILO, 2013) and prominent scholars argue that 
the ‘long wave’ of economic development is returning to a state that will lead to a revival 
of labour conflict (e.g. Kelly, 1998). The first studies asserting that strikes appear to be 
resurgent are now emerging (e.g. Brym et al., 2013), while up and coming economies 
like China face a rapidly increasing number of labour disputes (Cheng et al., 2012). In 
light of such trends, new insights into the long-standing puzzle of spillover and labour 
conflict hold particular importance.
Theory and hypotheses
Rational learning
The classic paradox that has driven the theoretical development of economic bargaining 
models of industrial conflict may be summarized as follows: conflicts in collective bar-
gaining, both manifest ones such as strikes and latent ones such as impasses (see 
Kaufman, 1981), are costly to both employers and employees, so why do they not avoid 
these costs and settle on the eventual outcome immediately (Hicks, 1932)? The general 
argument in economic bargaining models is that bargaining behaviour is determined by 
negotiators’ perceptions of aspects of the bargaining event that are critical to reaching an 
agreement but are not fully observable to all actors (Cramton and Tracy, 2003). These 
aspects are typically assumed to be bargaining power and the economic state of the firm 
(i.e. its profitability and consequently its ability to pay). Negotiators consequently face 
uncertainty because the true value of these factors is not fully observable (Shalev, 1980). 
To overcome this uncertainty, they use information that may reveal something about 
these factors. For instance, industrial relations and labour economics research consist-
ently finds an association between business cycle indicators and strikes (e.g. Card, 1990; 
Cramton and Tracy, 2003; Franzosi, 1989; Kaufman, 2002). The question of how changes 
in these business cycle indicators influence strikes (Kaufman, 1981: 334) is generally, 
though often implicitly, answered by assuming that negotiators use them to overcome 
their uncertainty about bargaining power or the economic state of the firm.
Similarly to business cycle indicators, information about bargaining events in the past 
of a bargaining unit and in other bargaining units may be indicative of bargaining power 
and a firm’s economic state (see Burgess, 1988). Hicks contends that ‘the majority of 
[…] strikes are doubtless the result of faulty negotiation […] Any means which enables 
either side to appreciate better the position of the other will make a settlement easier’ 
(1932: 146–7). Considering that bargaining units exist for multiple contract terms, ‘the 
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experience of striking offers the bargaining parties an opportunity to learn from their 
mistakes […] Thus one would expect bargaining units that have experienced a stoppage 
to be less likely to strike during future contract negotiation’ (Schnell and Gramm, 1987: 
222). In other words, by using the information obtained from previous bargaining events, 
negotiators improve their knowledge, thereby decreasing the probability of costly mis-
takes such as strikes or impasses.
A similar reasoning lies at the heart of Kuhn and Gu’s (1999) extension of asym-
metric information models of strikes that incorporates spillover across bargaining 
units. Asymmetric information models became a common solution to the Hicks bar-
gaining paradox in the 1980s and remain highly influential in strike research. These 
models generally assume that firms are better informed about their ability to pay than 
employees and their unions. Strikes force this information to be revealed. Firms will 
only take a strike if its anticipated costs are lower than the costs of giving in to union 
demands, i.e. they can use a strike to signal their limited ability to pay. Unions may 
use strikes as screening devices if they believe that firms are misrepresenting their 
true ability to pay. Kuhn and Gu (1999) argue that the economic state of different 
firms can be correlated, for instance when they are part of the same industry, due to 
shared changes in technology and product market conditions. Because outcomes and 
strikes reveal information about a firm’s ability to pay wages, union negotiators in 
bargaining units that negotiate later may obtain useful information by observing out-
comes and strikes in other bargaining units. By bringing union negotiators’ percep-
tions of the firm’s ability to pay closer in line with the firm’s true ability to pay, 
spillover is assumed to decrease conflict.
These theories share three building blocks:
1) strikes are a result of rational action under incomplete information;
2) spillovers improve information (negotiators are implicitly assumed to be affected 
only by spillovers that serve this function (cf. Kuhn and Gu, 1999: 122)); and
3) improved information reduces conflict.
Improving your own information by observing others is referred to by Kuhn and Gu as 
‘learning’. As this mechanism is based on strong rationality assumptions, it will be 
referred to as ‘rational learning’ here and the following hypothesis is derived:
Hypothesis 1) The more a negotiator is influenced by information about other bar-
gaining events, the less likely he or she is to experience conflict in collective 
bargaining.
Social comparisons
Tounadre and Villeval (2004) implemented an experimental test of Kuhn and Gu’s 
sequential bargaining model and found only limited evidence for rational learning across 
bargaining units decreasing conflict, a finding they explain by the impact of fairness and 
equity considerations. Equity theory stresses that people compare themselves with simi-
lar others. Adams notes that ‘[t]he fairness of an exchange between employee and 
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employer is not usually perceived by the former purely and simply as an economic mat-
ter. There is an element of relative justice involved that supervenes economics and 
underlies perceptions of equity or inequity’ (1963: 422). Therefore, workers will strive 
for wage rates comparable to those of workers in other companies performing similar 
tasks (see Akerlof and Yellen, 1990; Frank, 1984; Rees, 1993). Social comparisons of 
this type govern many decision making processes (Fehr and Falk, 2002) and empirical 
studies show that these social comparisons indeed play an important role in collective 
bargaining (Babcock et al., 1996, 2005). Besides comparisons with other workplaces, 
past wages are major determinants of employees’ preferred wages (Bewley, 1999), turn-
ing both previous outcomes and outcomes elsewhere into potential reference points (see 
Tversky and Kahneman, 1991).
Contrary to rational learning, the social comparison mechanism does not assume that 
spillovers occur only when information is relevant to unobservable critical aspects of the 
bargaining event. Rather, the evaluation of relevance is guided by self-interest (Rees, 
1993). Since firms and unions have opposing interests, these self-serving biases entail 
that spillovers will increase the divergence in their preferences, thereby leading to con-
flict. Social comparisons over time and between bargaining units thus lead to increased 
demands and conflicts. In contrast to hypothesis 1, this effect suggests the following 
competing hypothesis:
Hypothesis 2a) The more a negotiator is influenced by information about the out-
comes of other bargaining events, the more likely he or she is to experience conflict 
in collective bargaining.
Rational learning revisited: the sociological perspective
Spillover is an example of social influence, which figures prominently in sociological 
theory. For instance, it is argued that facing uncertainty, organizations and their leaders 
mimic other organizations (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983; Fligstein, 1985). Such organiza-
tional learning theories (see Levitt and March, 1988) stress the importance of diffusion in 
organizational networks. Similarly, following Coleman et al. (1957), the decisions of indi-
vidual actors are argued to be affected by their observation of the behaviour of others (see 
also Burt, 1987; Strang and Tuma, 1993). Highlighting the shortfalls of an atomized con-
ception of actors (Granovetter, 1985), a number of theoretical models (e.g. Granovetter, 
1978) have been developed sharing the core notion that an individual’s propensity to initi-
ate some action is positively affected by the number of others who have previously done 
so (Hedström and Swedberg, 1996). In a context of uncertainty, imitation is an ex ante 
rational strategy (Hedström, 1998), leading to the diffusion of behaviours.
Theories of diffusion have been applied to the analysis of societal conflict (e.g. 
McAdam, 1983), including strikes. Examining aggregate data on strikes in America, 
Chicago and Paris in the late 19th century, Biggs (2003, 2005) concludes that diffusion2 
plays an important role in strike waves. He proposes inspiration as a mechanism for dif-
fusion between workplaces, as strikes elsewhere create occasions for deciding to strike 
(cf. Oliver, 1989) and raise the hope of favourable results, especially when the observed 
strike is successful. Analysing strikes in coal mines in French departments for the period 
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1890-1935, Conell and Cohn (1995) find that strikes, even unsuccessful ones, in one 
department increase the strike rate in other departments. They propose three mecha-
nisms, as information about strikes in other workplaces may:
1) raise workers’ awareness of their own grievances;
2) serve a date setting function; and
3) offer tactical guidance by signalling favourable conditions for strike action.
The difference between diffusion-based approaches in sociology and rational learning 
theories in economics is remarkable. Whereas the latter associate spillover with decreased 
conflict, the former stress its conflict increasing effects. This is especially noteworthy 
because both mechanisms are based on models of rational actors using information about 
events elsewhere to make decisions under uncertainty.
However, while spillover models in economics were developed for contexts of union-
ized workers and collective bargaining, sociological diffusion theories until now have 
only been considered for periods preceding the institutionalization and pacification of 
industrial relations (see Biggs, 2005: 1685). To apply these insights to spillover in con-
temporary collective bargaining, one must account for a number of crucial differences 
between the two contexts:
1) The locus of decision making has shifted from individual workers to trade 
union and employer representatives. Even though industrial action is still car-
ried out by workers, conflicts now emanate from decisions made at the bar-
gaining table.
2) Date setting and consciousness raising are unlikely to be significant mechanisms 
leading to spillovers between bargaining units nowadays (Conell and Cohn, 
1995: 372).
3) Overt industrial conflict is much less frequent, limiting the number of observable 
events.
4) Collective bargaining occurs at fixed intervals, creating a series of related bar-
gaining events. This means that it is no longer just spillover from other work-
places that may trigger conflict; information about the past bargaining events in 
the negotiators’ own bargaining unit is likely to also be very influential.
To apply the lessons of diffusion models to contemporary collective bargaining, this 
study considers the effects of diffusion on negotiators. Negotiators are aware of what 
happens in other bargaining events through their personal and intra-organizational net-
works as well as through the public media. Furthermore, professional trade union and 
employers’ negotiators are involved in many different bargaining events, offering first 
hand access to information about them. Because mobilizing potential, strike funds, pub-
lic support and profits and bargaining power are often similar to bargaining events in the 
past and in other bargaining units, observing workers’ (un)willingness to participate in 
industrial action and the success of conflicts provides valuable tactical guidance.
Conflicting interests are inherent to the distributive nature of collective bargaining. 
Yet escalation is costly and its outcomes uncertain. Negotiators only risk conflict when 
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they expect that the benefits will outweigh the costs. Information about other bargaining 
events is invaluable for such decisions. All else being equal, negotiators who make more 
use of information about conflict potential in other bargaining events experience less 
uncertainty and are therefore more likely to choose conflict over compromise. Against 
hypothesis 1, the following competing hypothesis is proposed:
Hypothesis 2b) The more a negotiator is influenced by information about the conflict 
potential in other bargaining events, the more likely he or she is to experience conflict 
in collective bargaining.
Differences between union and firm negotiators
Strict adherence to the asymmetric information model used by Kuhn and Gu (1999) 
would suggest that only union negotiators need to reduce uncertainty by learning from 
other bargaining events, as firm negotiators are assumed to possess perfect information 
about their ability to pay. Therefore, the use of information about other bargaining 
events by firm negotiators cannot reduce the probability of conflicts. Social compari-
sons are traditionally primarily associated with workers’ rather than employers’ percep-
tions of reference wages. Past diffusion models of industrial conflict considered that the 
conflict increasing effects of spillover affect workers rather than firm owners. In con-
temporary labour relations, in which wages are predominantly determined under collec-
tive bargaining, something similar may hold true, albeit it for different reasons. For 
trade unions, high demands and industrial action can be of substantial propagandistic 
value for attracting new members (Akkerman, 2008). Conflict potential in other bar-
gaining events, regardless of its impact on the collective agreement, reveals important 
information about possible gains in membership from tough bargaining strategies. This 
implies that, particularly for union negotiators, these spillovers reduce uncertainty 
about the benefits of tough bargaining and may be sources of inspiration for imitative 
conflict. Hence whatever the direction of the effect of spillover on conflict, each theo-
retical approach suggests that this effect is stronger for unions than for firms, leading to 
the following interaction hypothesis:
Hypothesis 3) The association between the influence of information about other bar-
gaining events and experiencing conflict in collective bargaining is stronger for union 
negotiators than for firm negotiators.
The empirical context
Collective bargaining in the Netherlands
The Dutch economy features a large service sector, its share of the GDP being 74 per 
cent, whereas manufacturing accounts for 23 per cent (EIRO, 2008). The Netherlands 
has traditionally been a polarized society, divided along religious, ideological and status 
lines. Dutch industrial relations still reflect these divides, with the three major trade 
union federations representing Christian-democratic, social-democratic and white-collar 
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interests (EIRO, 2008). Multi-unionism, where different trade unions are involved in the 
same bargaining event, is common in collective bargaining in the Netherlands (Akkerman, 
2000, 2008). Trade union density had been declining in the past (Visser, 1992: 349) and 
is now relatively stable at approximately 24 per cent (EIRO, 2008). Collective agreement 
law requires that employers apply the collective agreement to all employees, regardless 
of their membership. The Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment usually extends 
sector level collective agreements, through which all employees in the sector are covered 
(Rojer, 2002). Consequently, collective bargaining coverage in the Netherlands is cur-
rently above 80 per cent (EIRO, 2008).
The Netherlands exhibits both sector and company level bargaining, with the sector 
level being dominant. There are approximately 1000 collective agreements, of which 
approximately 20 per cent are sector agreements. These may act as framework agree-
ments to company level bargaining (EIRO, 2008), i.e. in some cases there is a mixture of 
both types of agreement.
The Dutch system may be typified as state-sponsored coordination (Traxler, 
2003). Two important institutions coordinate labour relations at the national level. In 
the bi-partite Labour Foundation, peak organizations of trade unions and employer 
organizations meet. The Labour Foundation produces central agreements, which are 
not legally binding for the members of the peak organizations but carry significant 
weight as benchmarks for sector and firm level bargaining (Torenvlied and Akkerman, 
2002, 2004). During semi-annual consultations with the government, the Labour 
Foundation negotiates over social economic issues, such as the preferred wage 
increase. In addition to the Labour Foundation, representatives of the three main 
trade union federations, the three main employer confederations and independent 
members appointed by the government meet in the Social Economic Council (SER). 
The SER consults and acts as an advisory council on all major social and economic 
issues (EIRO, 2008).
Industrial conflict in the Netherlands
Compared to most other European countries, there is little strike activity in the 
Netherlands. The official annual number of strikes between 2005 and 2011 varied 
between 17 and 31. Approximately half of these strikes were related to disputes in col-
lective bargaining (CBS, 2012). The annual number of work days lost through industrial 
action varied substantially during this period, peaking at 120,600 in 2008 and dropping 
to as low as 4600 in 2009. Between 2005 and 2011, the number of workers involved in 
industrial action was also highest in 2008 (51,900) and lowest in 2009 (3600) (CBS, 
2012). Industrial action is most prevalent in manufacturing and transport.
Conflicts in collective bargaining are usually resolved by the bargaining parties them-
selves and occasionally through a mediator. The right to strike is recognized through the 
recognition of the European Social Charter and extends to the public sector. Employers 
may resort to legal action to prevent strikes. Although no distinction is made between 
essential and non-essential services, third-party interest may be invoked as a restriction 
on the right to strike (EIRO, 2002; EUROFOUND, 2012). The number of court interven-
tions in industrial action is relatively high (EIRO, 2002), suggesting substantial conflict 
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arising from collective bargaining that remains at least partially hidden from official 
strike statistics.
Data and measurements
Sample
Data from the 2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey (Lehr, 2011) were used. The initial sample 
for this survey consisted of negotiators involved in 125 company agreements and 42 sec-
tor agreements. 150 of these agreements were selected via a randomized procedure from 
the pool of the approximately 1000 collective agreements. An additional sample of 17 
agreements was added to the random sample to ensure sufficient variation on the depend-
ent variable. These agreements were selected on the basis of prior knowledge that there 
had been a bargaining impasse in the form of a union ultimatum. Data collection began 
in October 2011 and ended in January 2012. To limit the impact of potential retrospective 
bias, only agreements with starting dates from 1 January 2009 onwards were included. 
Moreover, to minimize the probability of collecting data on bargaining events that were 
still in progress, agreements with start dates after 1 April 2011 were excluded.
Through contacts with firms, trade unions and employer organization, as well as the 
extensive document analysis of (preliminary) contracts, official correspondence, com-
muniqués and media coverage, 307 negotiators involved in the 167 collective agree-
ments included in the sample were traced and invited by email to participate in an online 
survey. Five of the negotiators were involved in several of the collective agreements in 
the sample but were surveyed for just one.
The survey consisted of questions about: the negotiators’ background characteristics; 
various types and sources of information affecting collective bargaining; and the charac-
teristics of the collective bargaining event on the basis of which they were selected in the 
sample. Respondents were also asked to list the five most important other negotiators 
involved in their collective bargaining event. This strategy yielded 144 additional nego-
tiators, who were subsequently invited to participate in the study. In total, 451 negotia-
tors were invited, of whom 54.10 per cent were union negotiators and 45.90 per cent 
represented the interests of the firms. After two reminders, the non-responding negotia-
tors were contacted by telephone. A total of 128 negotiators involved in 78 of the 167 
selected collective agreements completed the questionnaire. The response rates were 
31.96 per cent for union negotiators and 24.15 per cent for firm negotiators, common 
response rates for surveys of professional organization representatives. No significant 
non-response bias was found regarding the distribution of union and firm negotiators and 
sector and company agreements.
Measures
Dependent variable. Conflict in collective bargaining was measured by asking negotia-
tors whether an impasse had occurred in their bargaining event and, if affirmed, whether 
any collective action was initiated by the workers and/or union(s) in the bargaining 
event. From these questions, an ordinal variable was created, with ‘0’ for ‘no conflict’, 
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‘1’ for ‘impasse, but no industrial action’ and ‘2’ for ‘industrial action’. If an impasse 
was reported, the respondents were asked what type of impasse and what were the sub-
stantive reasons for this impasse. An overview of the types of impasses and their reasons 
is reported in Appendix Tables A1 and A2. The Appendix is available via the Work, 
Employment and Society journal website.
Independent variables. Spillover may entail various types of informational content, each 
potentially differently associated with bargaining impasses. The statements used to 
measure spillover distinguished three types of informational content:3 information about 
outcomes; about employees’ readiness for industrial action; and about the success of 
industrial action. Besides informational content, sources of spillover may vary. Three 
potential sources were distinguished: first, the past of the negotiator’s own bargaining 
unit (prior contract periods); second, other companies within the same sector; and third, 
companies in other sectors. Respondents were asked to rate their agreement with nine 
statements about the influence of a particular type of information on their collective bar-
gaining. These nine statements are shown in Table 1. Possible answers ranged from 1 
(‘not at all’) to 5 (‘very much’), with a higher value indicating more influence of that 
type of information.4 To test whether the association between spillover and conflict is 
different for union and firm negotiators, a dummy variable was created for ‘union nego-
tiator’, where the firm negotiators represented the reference category.
Spillover scales. The limited sample size necessitated parsimonious multivariate models. 
Seeking a meaningful reduction of the number of independent variables, a principal com-
ponent analysis was performed5 (Appendix Tables A3 and A4 provide detailed informa-
tion on the bivariate correlations of the items and the PCA), which produced two 
components with an Eigenvalue larger than 1. The first component reflected the influ-
ence of information about readiness for and success of industrial action in the past of the 
bargaining unit and within the same sector (for these four items, Cronbach’s α = 0.89). 
The second component showed high loadings on the influence of information about 
Table 1. Overview of measurements for the influence of information about other bargaining 
events.
In general during collective bargaining, I am influenced by information about…
Outcomes for the same collective agreement in the past
Outcomes for collective agreements in other companies in the same sector
Outcomes for collective agreements in other sectors
Past readiness for industrial action of the employees covered by the collective agreement
Readiness for industrial action of employees in other companies in the same sector
Readiness for industrial action of employees in other sectors
The success of industrial action for the same collective agreement in the past
The success of industrial action in other companies in the same sector
The success of industrial action in other sectors
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outcomes, readiness for and success of industrial action in other sectors; and medium 
loadings for information about past outcomes and outcomes in the same sector (for these 
five items, Cronbach’s α = 0.76).
Regression scores for each case on the two components were calculated for subse-
quent analysis. The substantive interpretation of the first component is straightforward as 
the items clearly reflect information about conflict potential from proximate sources. 
The variable measuring these component scores was therefore labelled ‘proximate con-
flict spillover’. For the second component, the interpretation is less straightforward, with 
items referring primarily to information about other sectors and to a lesser extent to 
outcomes. The variable measuring its component scores was labelled ‘distal and out-
come spillover’.
Control variables. Montgomery and Benedict (1989) find that negotiator experience 
reduces strike incidence (cf. Reder and Neumann, 1980). The analysis therefore con-
trolled for negotiator experience, measured as the number of times a negotiator was 
previously involved in bargaining for the particular collective agreement for which he or 
she was selected in the sample.6 Bargaining level, the size of bargaining unit and sector 
specific economic conditions were also controlled for, using a dummy variable indicat-
ing sector agreements (with company agreements being the reference category), a vari-
able for (the logarithm of) the number of employees covered by the agreement and a 
categorical variable distinguishing between the primary, secondary (reference category), 
tertiary (commercial services) and quaternary7 (non-commercial services) sector.
Analyses
Descriptive statistics
Table 2 provides descriptive statistics on the variables. Of the 128 respondents, 44 
reported no conflict, while 72 experienced a bargaining impasse. In 12 cases there was 
industrial action. The past experience of a bargaining unit was the most influential source 
of spillover, followed by companies in the same sector, whereas information about other 
sectors was less influential. Furthermore, the reported influence of information about 
outcomes was generally higher than the influence of information about employees’ read-
iness for industrial action and about the success of industrial action. On the whole, these 
statistics suggest that negotiators are influenced by information spillover both within and 
between bargaining units and that this influence is larger when the source of information 
is more proximate.
Additional analyses (Appendix Table A5) showed that for all nine types of spillover, 
union negotiators reported more influence than firm negotiators. The differences in the 
average reported influence was particularly large for information about past readiness for 
and success of industrial action. Applying a series of independent sample t-tests, it was 
found that these differences between union and firm negotiators were statistically signifi-
cant (p<0.1; two-tailed) for all types of spillover except for information about outcomes 
in the past and in other sectors. The finding that spillovers have more influence on union 
negotiators than on firm negotiators is consistent with the economic rational learning 
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perspective, where it is argued to stem from unions’ informational disadvantage. It is also 
consistent with the adaption of the sociological diffusion approach presented in this arti-
cle, where it is argued that such spillovers are of particular strategic relevance to union 
negotiators. The following section tests these theories’ competing hypotheses about the 
impact of spillover on conflict.
Exploring the association between spillover and conflict
As a first step towards understanding the connection between spillover and conflict, the 
extent to which the mean values for the nine measurements of spillover differ between 
those negotiators who experienced some type of conflict (i.e. an impasse or industrial 
action), and those who did not, was investigated. (A full report of these bivariate analyses 
is available from the first author upon request.) The mean value was higher among those 
who had experienced conflict for all items. Independent sample t-tests revealed that the 
mean differences were not statistically significant for items relating to outcomes of bar-
gaining. However, the differences between mean values were found to differ signifi-
cantly with p at least <0.1 (two-tailed) for all items relating to readiness for industrial 
action and to success of industrial action. These findings point towards a positive asso-
Table 2. Descriptive statistics.
Valid N Min. Max. Mean Standard 
deviation
Conflict 128 0.00 2.00 0.75 0.61
Union negotiator (ref. firm negotiator) 128 0 1 0.61  
Negotiator experience 128 0.00 16.00 3.03 3.21
Sector agreement (ref. company 
agreement)
128 0 1 0.32  
Number of employees covered by 
collective agreement
128 18 819500 17583.56 75686.22
Outcomes for same collective agreement 
past
121 1 5 3.95 1.08
Outcomes for collective agreements in 
other companies, same sector
119 1 5 3.46 1.32
Outcomes for collective agreements, 
other sectors
115 1 5 3.06 1.16
Past readiness for industrial action 113 1 5 3.37 1.31
Readiness for industrial action in other 
companies, same sector
116 1 5 2.59 1.34
Readiness for industrial action, other 
sectors
106 1 5 2.08 1.07
Past success of industrial action 102 1 5 3.46 1.35
Success of industrial action in other 
companies, same sector
112 1 5 2.72 1.32
Success of industrial action, other sectors 102 1 5 2.12 1.11
Source: 2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey (Lehr, 2011).
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ciation between spillover and conflict, in particular in those cases where the informa-
tional content of spillover pertains to conflict potential.
Multivariate analyses of spillover and conflict
To control for possibly confounding factors and test the interaction hypothesis, multivari-
ate regression models of the effect of spillover on conflict were estimated. These models 
are reported in Table 3. The first main independent variable was the ‘proximate conflict 
spillover’ scale, referring primarily to the influence of information about the readiness for 
and success of industrial action in the past and within the same sector. The second main 
independent variable was the distal and outcome spillover scale, which mainly captured 
the influence of information about other sectors and about bargaining outcomes.
The dependent variable is ordinal. Likelihood-ratio tests of the proportionality of odds 
across response categories (Wolfe and Gould, 1998) showed that the parallel regression 
Table 3. Ordered logistic regression estimates of the effects of different types of spillover on 
the probability of experiencing conflict in collective bargaining (N = 112).
Independent Variables Model 1 Model 2
b s.e. b s.e.
Proximate conflict spillover 0.46* 0.19 0.67** 0.23
Distal spillover 0.09 0.18 0.15 0.19
Negotiator (dummy)  
 Firm Reference  
 Union 0.26 0.49
Negotiator experience 0.06 0.05
Agreement (dummy)  
 Company Reference  
 Sector 1.03a 0.57
Number of employees covered 
by collective agreement
–0.01 0.11
Economic sector (dummy)  
Primary –0.22 0.97
Secondary Reference  
Tertiary –0.00 0.48
Quaternary 1.60* 0.78
  
Wald χ2 5.79 28.69  
Df 2 9  
McKelvey and Zavoina’s 
pseudo R2
0.13 0.21  
aStatistically significant at the 0.1 level (two-tailed);
*at the .05 level
**at the .01 level
***at the .001 level.
Source: 2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey (Lehr, 2011).
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Figure 1. Predicted probabilities for the range of observed scores on the proximate conflict 
spillover scale.
Source: 2011 Dutch Negotiator Survey (Lehr, 2011).
assumption was not violated. Thus ordinal logistic regression models were fitted. 
Because in the sample there were negotiators from the same bargaining event, not all 
observations are independent. Therefore, cluster robust standard errors were estimated. 
Following Hagle and Mitchell (1992), McKelvey and Zavoina’s R2 was calculated, 
which may be interpreted as a close approximation of the R2 one would obtain from fit-
ting an OLS regression to the latent dependent variable representing the probability that 
the outcomes occur.
Model 1 in Table 3 shows the effects of proximate conflict spillover, as well as distal 
and outcome spillover on conflict. According to hypothesis 1, spillovers decrease con-
flict while hypothesis 2a predicts that spillovers related to outcomes increase conflict and 
hypothesis 2b states that spillover related to conflict potential increase conflict. The find-
ings indicate that if negotiators are more influenced by proximate conflict spillover, they 
are more likely to experience conflicts (p=0.016). An increase from the minimum to the 
maximum observed value on this scale was associated with a decrease by 0.45 of the 
predicted probability of no conflict, whereas the probabilities of an impasse and of indus-
trial action increased by 0.27 and 0.18, holding the distal and outcome spillover scale at 
its mean value. This finding runs against hypothesis 1 and offers support for the compet-
ing hypothesis 2b derived from sociological perspectives. Distal and outcome spillover 
does not significantly affect conflict. This suggests that spillovers predominantly increase 
conflict if the information refers to conflict potential and sources are sufficiently proxi-
mate and that neither the predictions based on rational learning (H1) nor social compari-
sons (H2a) are supported.
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For model 2, the dummy for union negotiator and the control variables negotiator 
experience, sector agreement, number of employees covered by the contract and eco-
nomic sector were added. The ordered logit estimate for proximate conflict spillover 
increased compared to model 1 and was statistically significant at p = 0.004. Figure 1 
illustrates the predicted probabilities as estimated in this model. For each of the three 
potential values for conflict, a line is drawn along the predicted probabilities for that 
value on the y-axis and the observed range of the proximate conflict spillover scale on 
the x-axis. From left to right, the downward sloping line shows the decreasing probabil-
ity of no conflict as the scores on proximate conflict spillover increase, while the two 
upward sloping lines conversely show the increasing probability of impasses and indus-
trial conflict.
To assess the robustness of these findings, the effects of the nine items used to meas-
ure spillover were also estimated separately (Appendix Table A6). Overall, the findings 
were very similar. However, conflict was also found to increase as the reported influence 
of information about the readiness for industrial action in other sectors increases, sug-
gesting that spillover effects on conflict are not wholly sector specific.
Hypothesis 3 predicts that any effect of spillover on conflict should be greater for 
union than for firm negotiators. The interaction terms between the union negotiator 
dummy and the two spillover scales estimated to test this hypothesis, however, consist-
ently failed to reach statistical significance throughout various potential model specifica-
tions. For reasons of space, these tests are not presented in Table 3.
Conclusion and discussion
This article has addressed the questions how and under which conditions information 
about other bargaining events affects conflict in collective bargaining. It offers the first 
simultaneous investigation of economic, social psychological and sociological 
approaches to this question. The article has further developed sociological theory to pro-
vide new insights into spillover and conflict in contemporary labour relations. Using 
original data on negotiators in collective bargaining, unique direct measurements of 
spillover and its impact on conflict were analysed. In this way, effects predicted by the 
different approaches were critically tested.
No significant effect of spillovers referring to outcomes (e.g. wages) in other bargain-
ing events was found. This suggests that neither the mechanisms described by economic 
rational learning, nor social comparisons theories by themselves, adequately describe the 
influence of spillover on conflict. As a caveat to this finding it must be noted that experi-
mental research suggests that either mechanism may be behaviourally plausible depend-
ing on specific conditions (Lehr et al., 2013), such that escalating and de-escalating 
spillovers could leave the average effect indeterminate.
Applying lessons from sociological diffusion theory, it was hypothesized that spillo-
vers carrying information about conflict potential in other bargaining events leads to 
more conflict. Indeed substantial support for this proposition was found. The more nego-
tiators are influenced by information about workers’ readiness for conflict and the poten-
tial success of conflict, the more likely it is that they experience conflicts in collective 
bargaining. Particularly spillovers from the past of the bargaining unit and within the 
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same sector are associated with increased conflict. The effect thus appears to depend on 
the proximity of the information source, a pattern presumably related to perceptions of 
relevance.
Union negotiators are unequivocally influenced more than firm negotiators by infor-
mation about other bargaining events. However, the relationship between spillover and 
conflict did not vary significantly between union and firm negotiators, indicating that 
spillovers can increase the probability of conflict for both types of negotiator. A potential 
explanation for this finding is that both sides of the bargaining table may opt for conflict 
and both sides face similar uncertainties about the associated costs and benefits.
Diffusion theories offer valuable insights into labour conflict but must be adapted to 
account for contemporary labour relations, which are marked by (repeated) collective 
bargaining and relatively few overt conflicts. Finding weak correlations between observ-
able conflict events may lead to the misleading conclusion that conflict in collective 
bargaining is not subject to social influences.
This study was constrained by the single-country, cross-sectional sample of modest 
size and by its reliance on retrospective data. A number of avenues for future research 
may be suggested. Incorporating questions measuring the influence of spillover in 
country comparative questionnaire surveys of negotiators could yield important 
insights into the effects of spillover in different institutional and economic contexts. 
The collection of matching employer-employee negotiators data offers the possibility 
to investigate how interactions of spillovers affect bargaining units. Given past chal-
lenges to the unitary actor assumption of union negotiators and employees (e.g. 
Ashenfelter and Johnson, 1969), the addition of matching employee data would allow 
the impact of their principal-agent relationship to be assessed. Moreover, as causality 
remains difficult to establish with cross-sectional data and panel data is costly and dif-
ficult to gather, studies of collective bargaining using pre- and post-measurements may 
prove invaluable. Alternatively, experiments offer a useful method to test the behav-
ioural assumptions underlying theories of spillover in a controlled environment. The 
combination of experimental insights with traditional econometric analyses and the 
use of qualitative and quantitative data gathered directly from negotiators promises a 
comprehensive understanding of the effects of spillover in employment relations.
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Notes
1. For instance, prolonging bargaining increases direct costs such as negotiator and staff salaries, 
overtime payments related to increased production in anticipation of a strike and increasing 
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the strike risk and its associated cost itself. Moreover indirect opportunity cost arises from the 
delayed implementation of improvements to work rules and structure.
2. In Biggs’s terminology, the process is referred to as ‘positive feedback’.
3. The favourability of information for negotiators was not quantified for three reasons: first, 
theoretically, the predicted prevailing effects of spillover on conflict is independent of favour-
ability (see also the designs and findings of Biggs, 2005; Conell and Cohn, 1995; Kuhn and 
Gu, 1999); second, empirically, such an exercise would entail a selective choice of specific 
bargaining events on the part of the researcher leading to the problem of a priori limiting of 
potential reference points; third, the validity of such measurements, i.e. researchers’ coding 
the potential favourability of specific information about specific bargaining events to negotia-
tors in other specific bargaining events, is at best problematic.
4. Given that some sectors exhibit a mixture of company and sector agreements, spillovers from 
other companies within the same sector cannot be excluded a priori, even for sector agree-
ments. However, some respondents that were selected for their involvement in sector agree-
ments had missing values for this information source. Their responses were substituted with 
the lowest possible value, indicating no influence.
5. The PCA was replicated with different treatments of missing values, i.e. listwise deletion and 
various imputation models. The extracted components and factor loadings remained reason-
ably stable and led to substantively similar interpretations throughout. The regression scores 
used in the multivariate analyses are based on data obtained with a multivariate imputation by 
chained equations model.
6. As an alternative, the estimates were also controlled for the impact of negotiator experience, 
measured as the number of years a respondent had been active as a collective agreement 
negotiator. This treatment did not alter the findings.
7. Two of the contracts in the sample were public sector agreements. The robustness of the find-
ings was confirmed by repeating all analyses excluding the corresponding negotiators.
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